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INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY VS.
THE “LABELING GAME” APPROACH:
KING V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY AND THE
BENEFITS OF APPLYING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO
PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
Patrick Bannon*
In previous cases dealing with First Amendment challenges to laws
regulating the speech of professionals, the Supreme Court has failed to
articulate a coherent “professional speech doctrine,” neither fully
defining the term nor identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny. A trio
of recent appellate court decisions—Pickup v. Brown in the Ninth
Circuit, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida in the Eleventh Circuit
and King v. Governor of New Jersey in the Third Circuit—highlight the
problems caused by this ambiguity and lack of guidance. All three courts
upheld the laws challenged in the respective cases but all applied
different reasoning in coming to their conclusions. The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits labeled the regulated verbal communications
“conduct” and applied rational basis review. The Third Circuit,
however, applied an intermediate level of scrutiny, recognizing that First
Amendment rights were implicated.
This Note argues that the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated
by the Third Circuit in King resolves the ambiguity created by the
Supreme Court in its professional speech cases and forecloses the
possibility that courts will be able to label the verbal communications of
professionals as either speech or conduct without any doctrinal basis for
doing so. This Note concludes that an intermediate scrutiny approach
ultimately provides greater protection for the interests at stake in laws
regulating professional speech—interests such as the First Amendment
rights of professionals, the right of patients and clients to receive
beneficial information, and the responsibility of the state to protect its
citizens through its police powers.
* J.D. Candidate Brooklyn Law School 2016; M.A. Fordham University 2012;
B.A. University of Scranton 2010. I would like to thank the Journal staff for
their help throughout the editing process and my parents, Jay and Tracy Bannon,
for their constant encouragement and support.
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INTRODUCTION
In September of 2012, California passed Senate Bill 1172 (“SB
1172”) which stated that “[u]nder no circumstances shall a mental
health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a
patient under 18 years of age.”1 The statute defined sexual
orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) as “any practices . . . that seek
to change an individual’s sexual orientation.”2 In enacting the law,
the legislature relied upon publications by medical organizations
like the American Medical Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the American Psychiatric
Association,3 which not only denounced the legitimacy of SOCE
as a medical practice but also warned of the serious harms
associated with it—harms which include depression, suicidality,
and substance abuse.4 California recognized its “compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth”
and targeted the statute specifically to prevent their “exposure to
the serious harms caused by [SOCE].”5 SB 1172 immediately
incited a First Amendment challenge and the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in upholding the law as a valid regulation of professional
conduct demonstrates the problems surrounding laws restricting
the speech of professionals. This Note will discuss the ambiguity
surrounding challenges to laws that regulate the speech of
physicians and will argue that the Supreme Court’s failure to fully
articulate a “professional speech doctrine” has caused confusion
among lower courts with the potential for problematic
consequences.
In two separate cases filed in the Eastern District of
California—Welch v. Brown6 and Pickup v. Brown7—SOCE
practitioners, SOCE patients and their parents, and SOCE
1

C AL . B US . & P ROF . C ODE § 865.1 (West 2014).
Id. § 865.
3
See S.B. 1172, 2011–2012 Sess., § 1 (b)–(d), (g) (Cal. 2012).
4
Id. § 1 (b), (d).
5
Id. § 1 (n).
6
Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
7
Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
2
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advocacy organizations8 claimed that, because SOCE consisted
only of verbal communications between the physicians and
patients, SB 1172 violated their First Amendment rights. In Welch,
Judge William Shubb granted a preliminary injunction, holding
that the SB 1172 should be subjected to strict scrutiny, and that it
would likely not satisfy that standard.9 Conversely, in Pickup v.
Brown, Judge Kimberly Mueller denied a preliminary injunction,10
holding that SB 1172 regulated conduct,11 that rational basis
should apply,12 and that the law would satisfy that standard.13 The
judges ultimately came to opposite conclusions, but both
significantly began their analysis by characterizing the verbal
communications in question as either speech or conduct, a
characterization which determined the standard of review.
The Ninth Circuit, in Pickup v. Brown,14 combined the cases
and ultimately affirmed the ruling of Judge Mueller, denying the
injunction on the same grounds.15 Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain,
however, rejected the panel’s reasoning and argued that the court
should apply a heightened standard of review as speech rights were
implicated.16 Judge O’Scannlain criticized the panel’s holding and
warned of the problematic17 consequences that would result if
courts could label the verbal communication of physicians as either
conduct or speech without any “principled doctrinal basis” for
8

In Welch, plaintiffs included two SOCE practitioners and a former SOCE
patient who had intended to become a SOCE practitioner. Welch, 907 F. Supp.
2d at 1106. In Pickup, plaintiffs included SOCE practitioners, SOCE patients
and their parents, and two SOCE advocacy organizations—The National
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”) and the
American Association of Christian Counselors (“AACC”). Pickup, 2012 WL
6021465, at *1.
9
Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
10
Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *1.
11
Id. at 9.
12
Id. at 12.
13
Id.
14
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
15
Id. at 1222.
16
Id. at 1218 (“SB 1172 prohibits certain ‘practices’ . . . but with regard to
[plaintiffs], those laws targeted speech. Thus, the First Amendment still
applies.”).
17
Id. at 1221.
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doing so.18 As indicated by the conflicting positions taken by
Judges Shubb and Mueller, this “labeling game”19 would allow
courts to “declare . . . categories of speech outside the scope of the
First Amendment” and also permit them to undermine the ability
of the states to regulate harmful practices like SOCE by subjecting
statutes like SB 1172 to the difficult strict scrutiny standard.20
In the past, the Supreme Court has considered challenges to
laws regulating the verbal communications of physicians and other
professionals, but it has never espoused a coherent professional
speech doctrine. The Court has neither provided a definition of
“professional speech” nor identified the applicable standard of
review for laws regulating it, resulting in confusion among lower
courts. The Fourth Circuit, in Moore-King v. County of
Chesterfield, VA., stated that “[u]nder the professional speech
doctrine, the government can license and regulate those who would
provide services to their clients for compensation without running
afoul of the First Amendment.”21 The court used this
understanding of the “professional speech doctrine” in applying
rational basis review to a spiritual advisor’s First Amendment
challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited her practice.22 The
Middle District of North Carolina, however, ruled that “what
‘professional speech’ means and the degree of protection it
receives” has not been defined, as “the phrase has been used by
Supreme Court justices only in passing.”23 The court ultimately
applied strict scrutiny and enjoined the enforcement of an informed
consent abortion statute that required physicians to display an
ultrasound to a woman seeking an abortion and describe the
images in detail.24 Scholars discussing the contours of the Supreme
Court’s amorphous “professional speech” jurisprudence have
defined the term as speech “uttered in the course of professional
18

Id. at 1215–16.
Id. at 1218.
20
Id. at 1221 (citations omitted).
21
Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va., 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir.
2013) (applying rational basis review to a spiritual advisor’s First Amendment
free speech challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited her practice).
22
Id. at 572.
23
Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
24
Id. at 432.
19
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practice,”25 but they have also recognized that the Supreme Court’s
treatment of such speech is “undoubtedly incomplete.”26 This lack
of guidance allows lower courts to arbitrarily characterize the
verbal communications of professionals as either speech or
conduct, characterizations which result in either the application of
strict scrutiny or rational basis review.
Pickup v. Brown, and two other recent federal appellate court
decisions—Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida27 and King v.
Governor of the State of New Jersey28—all demonstrate this
problem and reveal the benefits that would accompany a more
coherent professional speech doctrine. In Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Florida, physicians and physician-advocacy groups
challenged a Florida statute prohibiting “irrelevant inquiry and
record-keeping by physicians regarding firearms.”29 Prompted by
an incident in which a pediatrician terminated a professional
relationship with a mother who refused to answer routine questions
regarding firearms,30 the Florida legislature argued that the law
was necessary to prevent harassment of firearm owners and
preserve their access to health care.31 The plaintiffs argued that the
statute violated their First Amendment rights as it constituted a
“speaker- and content-based restriction[] on speech.”32
25

See David Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and
the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 771, 843
(1999). Halberstam’s analysis of the Court’s professional speech jurisprudence
has been influential and other academics have adopted his definition of
professional speech as well. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and
Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2368 (2013) (recognizing that
Hablerstam’s article was the first to address “the First Amendment’s interaction
with professional speech”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939,
947 (2007) (explicitly adopting Halberstam’s definition of professional speech).
26
Post, supra note 25, at 952.
27
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
28
King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
29
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203.
30
Id. at 1204 n.2.
31
Id. at 1204.
32
Id. at 1205. See also Brief for Appellees Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger, et al.,
760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14009-FF), 2012 WL 5457590, at *14
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found the act “a legitimate
regulation of professional conduct.”33 Mirroring the Ninth Circuit
in Pickup, and relying on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the court
upheld the statute without applying any heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.34 In a lengthy dissent, Judge Charles Wilson
criticized the majority opinion, arguing that the statute proscribed
First Amendment protected speech and that the court should
therefore subject the law to at least intermediate scrutiny.35 Unlike
his dissenting counterpart in Pickup, Judge Wilson analyzed the
statute on the merits under the intermediate scrutiny standard, by
which the statute could not pass constitutional muster.36
In King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, the Third
Circuit heard a challenge to a statute similar to the statute at issue
in Pickup.37 New Jersey Assembly Bill 3371 (“A3371”) prohibited
licensed mental health providers from engaging in SOCE with
persons under age eighteen.38 Plaintiffs39 brought a First
Amendment challenge using the same rationale as the plaintiffs in
Pickup.40 The Third Circuit, however, agreed with the plaintiffs
that the law regulated speech—not conduct—for purposes of the
First Amendment.41 The court then concluded that the First
Amendment did not fully protect the “speech that occurs as part of
a licensed profession”42 and that intermediate scrutiny should
apply.43 After a thorough analysis of the SOCE law, the Third
Circuit held that the statute satisfied the standard as it “directly
(describing that speaker- and content-based restrictions on speech are forbidden
by the First Amendment unless they can satisfy strict scrutiny).
33
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203 (emphasis added).
34
See id. at 1217.
35
Id. at 1230 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
36
Id.
37
See King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014).
38
Id. at 221.
39
Plaintiffs included two SOCE practitioners and the same two
organizations who challenged California’s SB 1172 in Pickup—NARTH and the
AACC. Id.
40
See id. at 222.
41
Id. at 229.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 237.
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advance[d]” the state’s “stated interest” and that it was no “more
extensive than necessary to protect that interest.”44 Significantly,
the Third Circuit provided a clear definition of the bounds of
professional speech and clearly identified intermediate scrutiny as
the appropriate standard of review.45
This Note will examine these three opinions in an attempt to
demonstrate the problems that emerge from the Supreme Court’s
“undoubtedly incomplete”46 definition of professional speech.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the definition and intermediate
scrutiny standard adopted by the Third Circuit in King resolve this
problematic ambiguity in a way that better protects the interests at
stake in professional speech cases. Part I will provide an overview
of the Supreme Court’s professional speech jurisprudence. This
part will address the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate any
definition of professional speech, and will also address the Court’s
concomitant lack of guidance to lower courts on the proper
standard to apply in First Amendment challenges to laws
implicating professional speech. This Note will focus primarily on
the cases relied upon by the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in
their respective opinions. Part II will then discuss Pickup,
Wollschlaeger, and King in greater depth and assess the merits of
each court’s rationale. Part III will then propose a solution for the
current problems with the professional speech doctrine: the
intermediate scrutiny standard adopted in King, and advocated by
Judges O’Scannlain and Wilson. This part will first address the
speech/conduct dichotomy that emerges from the Supreme Court’s
professional speech jurisprudence and discuss the problems that
this dichotomy creates. Part III will then demonstrate the benefits
of the intermediate scrutiny standard as articulated by the Third
Circuit. By clearly defining professional speech and articulating
the standard by which it is to be judged the Third Circuit’s
approach better protects the interests at stake in professional
speech cases and, as a result, the values underlying the First
Amendment.

44
45
46

Id. at 239–40 (citations omitted).
Id.
Post, supra note 25, at 952.
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I. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
The Supreme Court has addressed professional speech but has
never defined the term or established a legal standard of review for
analyzing restrictions on its content.47 The Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits all looked to a similar collection of cases in
which the Supreme Court dealt with professional speech, but their
analyses differed and at times conflicted with one another. The
circuit courts privileged some of the cases, downplayed the
significance of others, and, in some instances, ignored cases
completely. The fact that three different circuits, in cases dealing
with very similar First Amendment challenges, not only failed to
apply a single standard, but also failed to determine which
precedent should govern, only demonstrates how little guidance
the Supreme Court’s professional speech jurisprudence provides.48
A. Lowe v. S.E.C. and the “Origins” of the Professional
Speech Doctrine49
Lowe v. S.E.C.50 dealt with S.E.C. restrictions on a person’s
ability to provide investment advice without being registered under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.51 In this case, the S.E.C.
revoked the petitioner Lowe’s registration and prohibited him from
associating with any investment adviser.52 The S.E.C. then filed a
complaint arguing that Lowe’s publishing of an investment
newsletter—after his license had been revoked—violated the Act
47

See Halberstam, supra note 25, at 843–49.
See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (“Just
what ‘professional speech’ means and the degree of protection it receives is even
less clear; the phrase has been used by Supreme Court justices only in
passing.”). The discussion below is not comprehensive with regard to the
Supreme Court’s treatment of professional speech, but it does present some of
the cases that the circuit courts found applicable.
49
See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2368 (“Justice White’s concurrence in
Lowe is often invoked as setting forth the contours of the ‘professional speech
doctrine,’ to the extent that such a doctrine exists.”).
50
Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
51
Id. at 183.
52
Id.
48
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and their revocation order.53 As Justice Stevens framed the issue in
his majority opinion, “[t]he question is whether [Lowe and other
petitioners] may be permanently enjoined from publishing
nonpersonalized investment advice and commentary in securities
newsletters because they are not registered as investment advisers
under § 203(c) of the Investment Advisers Act.”54 The majority
expressly declined to address the First Amendment question,
deciding the case on statutory grounds, and thus finding no reason
to resolve any lurking constitutional infirmity.55 Justice White,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Burger, disagreed with the
majority’s narrow construction of the statute56 and framed the issue
as a constitutional one, involving “a collision between the power of
government to license and regulate those who would pursue a
profession or vocation and the rights of freedom of speech and of
the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”57 The three justices
concurred in the result—refusing to enjoin Lowe and others—but
did so on the grounds that enjoining the petitioners “from
publishing . . . [was] inconsistent with the First Amendment.”58 In
coming to this conclusion, Justice White took a contextual
approach, arguing that in cases involving regulations restricting
professional speech, courts should look to the relationship that
exists between the professional and the client.59

53

Id.
Id.
55
Id. at 211. Justice Stevens concluded that the petitioners could not be
permanently enjoined because the publications fell within a “statutory
exclusion” to the Investment Advisers Act. Id.
56
Id. at 226 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s zeal to avoid the
narrow constitutional issue presented by the case leads it to adopt a construction
of the Act that, wholly unnecessarily, prevents what would seem to be desirable
and constitutional applications of the Act-a result at odds with our longstanding
policy of construing securities regulation enactments broadly and their
exemptions narrowly in order to effectuate their remedial purposes.”).
57
Id. at 228.
58
Id. at 211.
59
Id. at 232. See also Halberstam, supra note 25, at 834–35 (arguing that
the Supreme Court cases which have dealt with professional speech, including
Lowe v. S.E.C., “may be read as having applied a contextual approach centered
around the roles of speaker and listener”).
54

658

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Justice White acknowledged the “power of the government to
regulate the professions” even when “the practice of a profession
entails speech,”60 but he also recognized that at a certain point a
legitimate regulation of a profession will restrict speech so much
that it violates the First Amendment.61 Justice White maintained
that the “professional’s speech [was] incidental to the conduct of
the profession” when that professional was “engaging in the
practice of [that] profession.”62 According to Justice White,
therefore, “generally applicable licensing provisions . . . [could
not] be said to [create] a limitation on freedom of speech or the
press subject to First Amendment scrutiny.”63 On the other hand,
when “the personal nexus between professional and client [did] not
exist” government regulation became “a regulation of speaking or
publishing . . . subject to the First Amendment.”64 Despite this
attempt to establish a line between the type of professional
relationship in which the speech is protected and the type in which
it is merely incidental to conduct, the Supreme Court has not used
the Lowe concurrence to establish a coherent professional speech
doctrine.65
This ambiguity has allowed for the development of Judge
O’Scannlain’s “labeling game” problem, by which courts can
arbitrarily use the speech/conduct dichotomy to subject the verbal
communications to either strict scrutiny or rational basis review.
Neither Judge O’Scannlain nor the panel in Pickup cited Lowe, but
King and Wollschlaeger rely upon it heavily in their analysis,66 and
in Wollschlaeger both the majority and dissent use it to support
60

Lowe, 472 U.S. at 229.
Id. at 230 (“At some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a
profession but a regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the
statute must survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.”).
62
Id. at 232.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2367–69 (arguing that, despite its
prevalence in subsequent cases, Justice White’s concurrence has not allowed for
the creation of a coherent “professional speech doctrine”).
66
See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir.
2014); King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir.
2014).
61
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opposite conclusions. The majority held that because the
questioning and record keeping prohibited by the Florida statute all
took “place entirely within the confines of the physician-patient
relationship, where the ‘personal nexus between professional and
client’ is strong,” they constituted only conduct.67 Judge Wilson,
on the other hand, argued that such a reading of Justice White’s
rationale problematically espouses “the far broader principle that
the right of the professional to speak is lost whenever he is
practicing his profession”—a principle Lowe itself explicitly
rejects.68 Despite the Lowe concurrence’s impact on “professional
speech” jurisprudence, Justice White’s rationale permitted the
development of the “labeling game” approach, providing courts
and legislatures with the ability to insulate laws regulating verbal
communication from any First Amendment scrutiny by merely
identifying a professional relationship and then labeling the
communications within that relationship as “conduct.”69
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Compelled
Speech Abortion Cases
The Supreme Court’s treatment of professional speech in the
medical context has appeared almost exclusively in abortion
cases.70 The First Amendment implications of these decisions,
however, have often been overshadowed by the other aspects of
the Court’s abortion cases.71 In two cases from the 1980’s, City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.72 and
67

Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White,
J., concurring in the result)).
68
Id. at 1240 n.9 (Wilson, J., dissenting)
69
This point is discussed below in Part III.
70
Halberstam, supra note 25, at 835 (“In the Supreme Court, the most
sustained discussion about speech in the professions has centered around
physicians’ speech on the subject of contraception and abortion.”).
71
Id. As Halberstam notes, the Supreme Court generally focused its
attention on the issue of whether the patient is exercising a fundamental right
and the issue of whether “a physician’s constitutional rights are to be subsumed
under the rights of the patient . . . .” Id. The Court does not discuss the First
Amendment implications at all in City of Akron and Thornburgh and dismisses
them in a single paragraph in Casey.
72
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 442
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Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,73 the Court invalidated statutory provisions that
required physicians to recite certain information in order to obtain
a patient’s “informed consent” to an abortion. In neither opinion,
however, did the majority address the First Amendment issues and
instead struck down the provisions on the ground that they were
designed not to “inform” but rather to “persuade” a patient to
withhold her consent.74 A few years later, in Planned Parenthood
(1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). The ordinance stated:
[T]he woman must be orally informed by her attending
physician of the status of her pregnancy, the development of
her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and
emotional complications that may result from an abortion, and
the availability of agencies to provide her with assistance and
information with respect to birth control, adoption, and
childbirth.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The ordinance further stated:
[T]he attending physician must inform [the woman] of the
particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the
abortion technique to be employed . . . [and] other information
which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her decision
as to whether to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to
term.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
73
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 760 (1986) overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The statute in Thornburgh
required that the physician tell the patient five separate pieces of information
before “informed consent” could be obtained:
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion,
(b) the fact that there may be detrimental physical and
psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable, (c)
the particular medical risks associated with the particular
abortion procedure to be employed, (d) the probable
gestational age, and (e) the medical risks associated with
carrying her child to term.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
74
City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (holding that the statute “extend[ed] the
State’s interest in ensuring ‘informed consent’ beyond its permissible limits”);
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765 (“The scope of the information required and its
availability to the public belie any assertions by the Commonwealth that it is
advancing any legitimate interest.”).
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court finally addressed
the First Amendment concerns in the informed consent statutes and
held that, despite the physicians’ First Amendment rights, the State
had the power to regulate their speech so long as the regulation
was “reasonable.”75
Although Casey acknowledged that statutes regulating
physicians’ professional speech implicate the First Amendment,
the decision has caused confusion both because of the Court’s
cursory treatment of the issue and because of the lack of guidance
it ultimately provided.76 The following is the entirety of the Justice
O’Connor’s treatment of the First Amendment issue, including the
precedent cited to support her reasoning:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not
to provide information about the risks of abortion,
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights
not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752
(1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S.
Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). We see no
75

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion). Casey explicitly overruled the parts of Akron and
Thornburgh which conflicted with this holding. Id. at 882 (plurality opinion)
(“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and
those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go
too far, are inconsistent with [Roe v. Wade’s] acknowledgment of an important
interest in potential life, and are overruled.”).
76
See Halberstam, supra note 25, at 773. (“The passage [dealing with the
First Amendment issue] tells us the physicians enjoy First Amendment rights
but provides little guidance about the weight given to the First Amendment
interests involved.”); see also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2351–61 (2013)
(suggesting that the Court’s cursory treatment of the First Amendment question
could have resulted from a lack of attention given to issue in the briefs of both
the parties and the amici).
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constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the
physician provide the information mandated by the
State here.77
This brief treatment of the physicians’ First Amendment
challenge—despite its recognition that compelled speech in the
medical profession is constitutionally permissible—still failed to
articulate a clear professional speech doctrine.78 The Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment rights of professionals are
diminished when they speak “as part of the practice of medicine,”
but the opinion also implies that the verbal communications in
question are speech—not conduct—and that the restrictions on
those communications must be “reasonable.”79
As with Lowe, lower courts have found Casey to be a necessary
part of their professional speech analysis, but they have disagreed
as to how Casey characterizes professional speech, and what
standard of review the case proposes. The Ninth Circuit found
Casey to suggest that, in certain instances of professional speech,
77

Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Academics have noted that much of the
confusion surrounding this passage comes from the Court’s choice of precedent.
See Post, supra note 25, at 946 (“The passage is puzzling because Wooley is a
precedent in which the Court applied strict First Amendment scrutiny to a state
statute that compelled ideological speech, whereas Whalen upheld a New York
statute requiring physicians to disclose prescriptions for certain drugs, holding in
the page cited that “[i]t is, of course, well settled that the State has broad police
powers in regulating the administration of drugs by the health professions.
Exactly how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are meant to
qualify the broad police power discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”);
Halberstam, supra note 25, at 773–74 (“The application of Wooley would
demand a compelling governmental interest to overcome the physician’s First
Amendment rights, or at least a substantial interest that was unrelated to the
content of the speech. It would require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
that interest as well. The passage cited from Whalen, on the other hand would
appear to import only the basic due process limitations on nonspeech regulations
of professionals. To fuse these two models in a shorthand formulation provides
little indication of how to resolve any professional’s First Amendment claim
other than the precise one at issue in Casey.”).
78
Keighley, supra note 25, at 2354 (“The joint opinion’s brief treatment of
the First Amendment issues raised by the Pennsylvania statute provides minimal
information about how the Court views the interplay between the state’s ability
to regulate the medical profession and physicians’ First Amendment rights.”).
79
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
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First Amendment protection is merely diminished, not
eliminated.80 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, used the
plurality’s reasoning to support its conclusion that the act in
question regulated professional conduct and therefore did not
“offend the First Amendment.”81 The Third Circuit determined
that, “to the extent that Casey applied rational basis review,” it was
nevertheless inapplicable to New Jersey’s A3371, as the law was
“a prohibition of speech, not a compulsion of truthful factual
information.”82
C. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and the Protection
of Speech
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court addressed a
federal statute83 that banned providing “material support or
resources to certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist
activity.”84 A group of U.S. citizens and human rights
organizations challenged the statute on First Amendment free
speech grounds.85 The plaintiffs stated that they wanted to “provide
support for the humanitarian and political activities” of two groups
designated as terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State.86
Because this support would come in the form of “legal training”
and “political advocacy” and would be undertaken entirely through
verbal communication, the plaintiffs claimed that the statute
violated their First Amendment rights.87 The majority rejected both
the Government’s argument that the statute regulated only conduct
and the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute banned “pure political
80
81

Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2013).
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1220 (11th Cir.

2014).
82

King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 650–51 (1985)).
83
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2014).
84
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7 (2010) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 10.
87
Id.

664

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

speech.”88 The Court applied strict scrutiny but still found that the
statute survived this standard.89 The Court, however, explicitly
limited its holding to the facts before it and recognized that other
applications of the same statute or other statutes “relating to speech
and terrorism” may not meet the high standard the Court applied.90
Humanitarian Law Project fits somewhat uncomfortably with
professional speech cases because it does not look at the
relationship between a professional and a client. Although the
plaintiffs were legal professionals and human rights workers
looking to provide legal and humanitarian counseling,91 the Court
did not apply Justice White’s “personal nexus” analysis.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court did not rely upon any of the
previous professional speech rationales and not all of the appellate
court cases discussed above found it applicable.92 Judge
O’Scannlain93 and the King panel found the case relevant in the
professional speech context, however, because it “makes clear that
verbal or written communications, even those that function as
vehicles for delivering professional services, are ‘speech’ for
purposes of the First Amendment.”94 According to this rationale,
Courts cannot simply call verbal or written communication
“conduct” for the purposes of their analyses and apply rational
basis review—or no review at all—whenever they find a
professional-client relationship without subverting the core freespeech principles of Humanitarian Law Project.95
88

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 39.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 10.
92
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Wollschlaeger mentioned the case
and the panel in Pickup immediately dismissed it as inapposite. See Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In sharp contrast, Humanitarian
Law Project pertains to a different issue entirely: the regulation of (1) political
speech (2) by ordinary citizens.”).
93
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order
denying rehearing en banc) (“The Supreme Court’s implication in Humanitarian
Law Project is clear: legislatures cannot nullify the First Amendment’s
protections for speech by playing this labeling game.”).
94
King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (2014).
95
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1220–21 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order
denying rehearing en banc).
89
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D. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
While the Supreme Court has failed to fully articulate a
“professional speech” doctrine, it has developed a commercial
speech doctrine which is considerably more defined.96 The Court’s
commercial speech jurisprudence becomes important in the context
of professional speech as King relies upon it heavily in adopting its
intermediate scrutiny standard.97 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that commercial speech, defined as speech
“which does no more than propose a commercial transaction” is
still entitled to First Amendment protection.98 The Court justified
protecting this speech on the grounds that commercial speech, even
in the form of advertising, serves “the particular consumer’s
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”99 This
interest, according to the Court, may “may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than [the consumer’s] interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate.”100 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court more
clearly recognized that commercial speech is provided “a lesser
protection” than “other constitutionally guaranteed expression” and
is only protected if it is “neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity.”101 To defend a statute regulating commercial speech
96

For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the commercial
speech doctrine, see Halberstam, supra note 25, at 779–92.
97
See King, 767 F.3d at 234 (“In explaining why [intermediate scrutiny] is
appropriate, we find it helpful to compare professional speech to commercial
speech.”). Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (“To the
extent that there is some commercial or professional speech involved here, it is
intertwined with non-commercial speech and thus entitled to the full protection
of the First Amendment.”). See also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2365–66
(analyzing the analogy to commercial speech and reflecting on its relevance in a
discussion of professional speech).
98
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (invalidating a Virginia statute which prohibited
pharmacists from advertising drug prices on the grounds that it violated the First
Amendment by suppressing the free flow of prescription drug information).
99
Id. at 763–64.
100
Id. at 763.
101
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
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against the court’s intermediate scrutiny standard, “[t]he state must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by [the restriction]” and
“[t]he limitation on expression must be designed carefully to
achieve the State’s goal.”102
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding
professional speech and the apparent confusion among circuits, the
Third Circuit turned to the Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence, ultimately concluding “that professional speech
should receive the same level of First Amendment protection as
that afforded to commercial speech.”103 Significantly, however, the
Third Circuit did not contend that commercial speech and
professional speech were the same type of expression, but merely
stressed that the same considerations that caused the Supreme
Court to protect commercial speech with intermediate scrutiny
were present in the professional speech context.104 First of all,
professional speech, like commercial speech, “occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation,”105 a fact which
supports providing it with “diminished [First Amendment]
protection.”106 Secondly, “professional speech, like commercial
speech, serves as an important channel for the communication of
information that might otherwise never reach the public.”107
Providing some First Amendment protection, therefore, “facilitates
the ‘the free flow of commercial information,’ in which both the

U.S. 557, 557 (1980).
102
Id. at 564. The Court would go on to state:
Compliance with [the intermediate scrutiny standard] may be
measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly
advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for
the government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive.
Id.
103
King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014).
104
Id. at 234–35.
105
Id. at 234 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564).
106
Id.
107
Id.
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intended recipients and society at large have a strong interest.”108
The Third Circuit clearly distinguishes between the two categories
of speech, and academics have warned about the problems of
conflating the two,109 but by recognizing the similarities between
them, the court used the much more coherent commercial speech
doctrine to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard for professional
speech.110
II. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT PROFESSIONAL SPEECH CASES
Despite the many times that the Supreme Court has dealt with
cases involving a First Amendment challenge to the verbal
communications of professionals, and despite the considerable
body of law surrounding commercial speech, the Court has failed
to adequately address professional speech. The trio of recent
appellate court decisions introduced above—Pickup v. Brown,
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, and King v. Governor of the
State of New Jersey—demonstrate the confusion that this
ambiguity has caused, and also reveal some of the problematic
consequences that can result. With no definition of professional
speech and no clear standard of review, lower courts and
legislatures are free to continue to play the dichotomous “labeling
game” that was of so much concern to Judge O’Scannlain. A more
in-depth discussion of Pickup and Wollschlaeger will demonstrate
some of the confusion and hint at some of its consequences, and a
discussion of the Third Circuit’s formulaic approach in King will
reveal how the introduction of an intermediate scrutiny standard
can resolve the issues the “labeling game” creates.
A. Pickup v. Brown
As discussed in the Introduction, in Pickup v. Brown111 the
Ninth Circuit considered a First Amendment challenge to
108

Id. at 233 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976)).
109
See Post, supra note 25, at 980 (urging that the “analogy to commercial
speech should not be pressed too far”).
110
King, 767 F.3d at 235.
111
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
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California Senate Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”), which prohibited “statelicensed mental health provider[s]” from engaging in SOCE with
patients under eighteen.112 The Ninth Circuit, having combined
two district court cases which reached conflicting conclusions,
ultimately held that SB 1172 regulated conduct and did not violate
the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs.113
The court began its analysis by determining whether the
prohibition on SOCE constituted a regulation of conduct or
speech.114 Relying upon two prior Ninth Circuit opinions—
National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v.
California Board of Psychology (“NAAP”) and Conant v.
Walters115—the court concluded that, although “communication
that occurs during psychotherapy does receive some constitutional
protection . . . it is not immune from regulation.” 116 Then, turning
to Casey and Lowe, the court conceptualized a “continuum” along
which it could identify the First Amendment rights of
112

C AL . B US . & P ROF . C ODE § 865 (West 2012).
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222.
114
Id. at 1225. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that SB 1172 did
not do any of the following: (a) “Prevent mental health providers from
communicating with the public about SOCE;” (b) “Prevent mental health
providers from expressing their views to patients, whether children or adults,
about SOCE, homosexuality, or any other topic;” (c) “Prevent mental health
providers from recommending SOCE to patients, whether children or adults;”
(d) “Prevent mental health providers from administering SOCE to any person
who is 18 years of age or older;” (e) “Prevent mental health providers from
referring minors to unlicensed counselors, such as religious leaders;” (f)
“Prevent unlicensed providers, such as religious leaders, from administering
SOCE to children or adults;” (g) “Prevent minors from seeking SOCE from
mental health providers in other states.” Id. at 223.
115
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1225. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that California’s psychologist licensing laws did not violate physicians’
First Amendment rights, even though “some speech interest may be implicated”
as the laws represented a valid, content neutral exercise of the state’s police
power); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (enjoining a statute
which threatened professional sanction for a physician who recommended the
use of a controlled substance for medical purposes on the grounds that the
“enforcement policy threatens to interfere with expression protected by the First
Amendment”).
116
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227.
113
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professionals.117 The court stated that “[a]t one end of the
continuum, where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue,
First Amendment protection is at its greatest.”118 The court
characterized this speech as “outside the doctor-patient
relationship” and considered professionals engaging in it as
“constitutionally
equivalent
to
soapbox
orators
and
pamphleteers.”119 The court then identified an intermediate point
“within the confines of the professional relationship,” where the
“First Amendment protection of a professional’s speech is
somewhat diminished.”120 In these intermediate situations,
according to the court, “the First Amendment tolerates a
substantial amount of speech regulation.”121 At the far end of the
continuum, the court identified the “regulation of professional
conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such
regulation may have an incidental effect on speech.”122 Such
regulation is “subject to only rational basis review and must be
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest.”123
In concluding that SB 1172 only regulated professional
conduct, the court reasoned that SOCE constituted a medical
treatment, not an expressive communication, and “the fact that
speech may be used to carry out [SOCE did] not turn the regulation
of conduct into a regulation of speech.”124 Relying on its own
precedents in NAAP and Conant, and explicitly rejecting the
applicability of Humanitarian Law Project,125 the court concluded
that “the First Amendment does not prevent a state from regulating
treatment even when the treatment is performed through speech
alone.”126 Any effect SB 1172 “may have [had] on free speech
117

Id. at 1227–29.
Id. at 1227.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1228.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1229.
123
Id. at 1231.
124
Id. at 1229.
125
Id. (“Plaintiffs contend that Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
supports their position. It does not.”).
126
Id. at 1230.
118
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interests [was] merely incidental” and did not alter the analysis.127
When the court issued its order denying rehearing en banc,
Judge O’Scannlain wrote a lengthy dissent in which he rejected the
court’s rationale, arguing that the panel’s opinion “contravenes
recent Supreme Court precedent, ignores established free speech
doctrine, misreads [Ninth Circuit] cases, and . . . insulates from
First Amendment scrutiny California’s prohibition—in the guise of
a professional regulation—of politically unpopular expression.”128
Judge O’Scannlain rejected the panel’s continuum as establishing a
problematic speech/conduct dichotomy without providing any
“principled doctrinal basis” for navigating it.129 He further
contended that the panel’s labeling of certain verbal
communications as “conduct” had the effect of creating “a
potentially broad exception to the First Amendment for certain
categories of speech.”130 He argued that Humanitarian Law
Project clearly provided that “legislatures [could not] nullify the
First Amendment’s protections for speech by playing [this]
labeling game.”131 Judge O’Scannlain declined to assess the merits
of the statute according to a more heightened First Amendment
scrutiny,132 and concluded by warning that the panel’s “labeling
game” approach would leave whole categories of speech, and
perhaps disfavored speech in general, exempted from First
Amendment protection.133 Although not discussed by Judge
O’Scannlain, this labeling game could also undermine the state’s
ability to protect its citizens against harmful practices like SOCE
by characterizing verbal communications as speech and applying
strict scrutiny, a problem illustrated in Welch v. Brown.

127

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing
en banc).
129
Id. at 1215–16.
130
Id. at 1221.
131
Id. at 1218.
132
Id. at 1221.
133
Id. at 1221 n.12 (“If a state may freely regulate speech uttered by
professionals in the course of their practice without implicating the First
Amendment, then targeting disfavored moral and political expression may only
be a matter of creative legislative draftsmanship.”).
128
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B. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida
In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,134 the Eleventh
Circuit dealt with a different type of statute than that at issue in
Pickup or King, but one which involved a very similar analysis. In
2011, Florida passed the “Firearm Owners Privacy Act” (“FOPA”)
which prohibited licensed “health care practitioner[s]” and licensed
“health care facilit[ies]” from asking questions about and keeping
records on their patients’ firearm ownership.135 A group of
plaintiffs, including individual physicians, the Florida Chapters of
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of
Family Physicians, and the American College of Physicians,
challenged the law on First Amendment grounds.136 The Southern
District of Florida granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction137 and, in a subsequent proceeding, granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.138 The District Court
concluded that the Act “impose[d] restrictions on the content of

134

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
F LA . S TAT . § 790.338 (2011). The Act contained several provisions that
were also included in the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities.
Id. § 381.026. Four provisions of FOPA were at issue. Id. The first—the record
keeping provision—prohibited licensed practitioners from “intentionally
enter[ing] any disclosed information concerning firearm ownership into the
patient’s medical record if the practitioner knows that such information is not
relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others.” Id. §
790.338. The second—the inquiry provision—prohibited licensed practitioners
“from making a written inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of
a firearm or ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the patient, or
the presence of a firearm in a private home or other domicile of the patient or a
family member of the patient.” Id. The third—the discrimination provision—
prohibited licensed practitioners from “discriminat[ing] against a patient based
solely upon the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to own and possess
firearms or ammunition.” Id. The fourth—the harassment provision—prohibited
licensed practitioners “from unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm
ownership during an examination.” Id.
136
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1203.
137
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1380, 1384 (S.D. Fla.
2011).
138
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
135
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practitioners’ speech” and that therefore strict scrutiny should be
applied.139
The Eleventh Circuit majority, on the other hand, concluded
that all four challenged provisions were “valid regulations of
professional conduct” with “only an incidental effect on
physicians’ speech.”140 Balking at the District Court’s standard of
review, the court held that because the challenged provisions
regulated only medical treatment and not speech, they did not
violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.141 Relying primarily
on Lowe and Casey, the majority focused initially on the
physician-patient relationship and applied Justice White’s
reasoning that First Amendment protections diminish when a
“personal nexus between professional and client” exists. 142 The
majority cited with favor the Ninth Circuit’s continuum analysis in
Pickup and ultimately adopted its reasoning.143 Although the
majority discussed an intermediate point on the continuum of
professional speech, it failed—like the Ninth Circuit panel—to
fully define it or identify the standard by which it could be
reviewed.144 The majority ultimately held that the Act did “not
facially violate the First Amendment.”145
139

Wollschlaeger, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1218 (quoting Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White,
J., concurring)) (“These protections are at their apex when a professional speaks
to the public on matters of public concern; they approach a nadir, however,
when the professional speaks privately, in the course of exercising his or her
professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional’s services.”).
143
Id. at 1225 (“Pickup is instructive as a recent example of a court
applying Justice White’s reasoning in Lowe in conjunction with Casey to uphold
a regulation of professional conduct with incidental effect on speech, outside of
the context of a license requirement.”).
144
Id. at 1223 (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir.
2013)) (“The Ninth Circuit placed the requirement that health care providers
communicate certain information to patients that was challenged in Casey ‘at the
midpoint of the continuum’ noting that the speech at issue took place ‘within the
confines of a professional relationship.’”).
145
Id. at 1217. As the Third Circuit noted in King when it discussed
Wollschlaeger, the majority does “not explicitly identify the level of scrutiny [it
applies].” King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235 n.19
140
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Judge Wilson penned a lengthy dissent, arguing that the court
should apply either intermediate scrutiny or even strict scrutiny to
the Florida statute.146 He began by stating that the majority
incorrectly used Lowe to contend that, as long as a person is
“operating within the confines of [a professional] relationship,” her
speech can be regulated without First Amendment protection.147
The majority impermissibly extended Lowe in a way foreclosed by
subsequent cases, including Humanitarian Law Project.148 Judge
Wilson also rejected the court’s use of Pickup, claiming that the
majority used the case to establish the problematic speech/conduct
dichotomy.149 Judge Wilson highlighted the way in which the
majority glossed over Pickup’s recognition of a “midpoint [on] the
[professional speech] continuum,” one which it recognized from its
reading of Casey.150 The court engaged in the same type of
“labeling game” as the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, despite the fact the
SOCE could be considered a medical treatment—albeit a harmful
one—while firearm inquiries and record keeping certainly could
not.151 As such, the court should have adopted an intermediate
(3d Cir. 2014). The majority found FOPA to be a “valid regulation of
professional conduct” but did not address whether it applied rational basis or no
review at all. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217. Judge Wilson, however,
understood the majority to have applied rational basis review in its analysis. Id.
at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
146
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1256 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 1240 (“Lowe established only that the existence of a professional
relationship is a necessary condition if a law burdening speech is to evade First
Amendment scrutiny. Nothing in Lowe implied that such a condition was
sufficient to support this conclusion.”).
148
Id. at 1241. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2677 (2011)
(applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny to a Vermont statute restricting
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records); Florida Bar. v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–34 (1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a Florida
statute prohibiting members of the Florida bar from sending direct-mail
solicitations to victims for 30 days after an accident or disaster); Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (applying heightened scrutiny to a
statute that prohibited providing “material support” to terrorist organizations
when that support comes in the form of humanitarian and legal advocacy).
149
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1247 (Wilson J., dissenting).
150
Id. (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013)).
151
Id. at 1248.
Here, in stark contrast to Pickup where all of the burdened
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scrutiny standard, as FOPA implicated the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.152
Judge Wilson’s dissent, in addition to criticizing the majority’s
rationale, reflects Judge O’Scannlain’s concern regarding the
potential consequences of a holding that eliminates professional
speech from any First Amendment review.153 Judge Wilson
contended that the majority’s holding created “a new category of
speech immune from First Amendment review” in direct
contradiction of Supreme Court precedent.154 The result, according
to Judge Wilson, is far worse than Judge O’Scannlain warned in
Pickup, however, as the majority’s holding, instead of merely
creating a “labeling game” with the potential for abuse, forced all
speech within a professional relationship into a category of
“conduct” that receives no First Amendment protection.155
speech was the functional equivalent of providing a drug, none
of the speech burdened by the Act fits in that exceedingly
narrow category. Asking irrelevant questions about firearm
ownership, recording the answers, or harassing a patient based
on firearm ownership—by persistently and irritatingly
discussing the subject—is nothing like giving a patient a drug
or performing SOCE therapy.
Id. Wilson recognizes here that, although he does use Pickup to support his
position, he makes “no comment as to whether Pickup was correctly decided.”
Id. His concern is rather with discrediting the majority’s reliance on it in
supporting its position. Id.
152
Id. at 1230–31.
153
See id. at 1248 n.16 (stating that he shares Judge O’Scannlain’s concern
that that the ability to label speech within a professional relationship as conduct
would exempt regulations from any First Amendment protection).
154
Id. at 1237. Judge Wilson also asserted that as a result of the court’s
holding “all speech between professionals and patients/clients—so long as it
occurs within the confines of a one-on-one professional relationship—can be
burdened by States without scrutiny.” Id.
155
Id. at 1248 n.16 (“The Majority proves the point by explaining that the
line between unprotected conduct and protected speech in the professional
setting is not clear here and indeed cannot be found. Shockingly, the Majority
turns the absence of a clear dividing line between these very different categories
of speech into an invitation for States to regulate all of it without scrutiny. If the
court in Pickup erred, it did so by putting too much speech into the unprotected
category. . . . The Majority has multiplied that error many times over.”).
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C. King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey
In King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, the Third
Circuit dealt with a First Amendment challenge to a statute similar
to California’s SB1172.156 New Jersey’s Assembly Bill A3371
(“A3371”) prohibited persons “licensed to provide professional
counseling” in the state from “engag[ing] in sexual orientation
change efforts with a person under 18 years of age.”157 The New
Jersey legislature relied upon the same medical publications cited
by the California legislature and also expressly tailored the statute
to protect minor patients.158 Doctors involved with SOCE and
other advocacy groups challenged the statute, claiming that A3371
violated their First Amendment free speech rights.159 The District
of New Jersey, relying heavily on the reasoning in Pickup,160
rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, saying that the
statute regulated conduct and withstood rational basis review.161
The Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court and
upheld the statute, but concluded—unlike the courts in Pickup and
Wollschlaeger—that the statute restricted speech and intermediate
scrutiny should therefore apply.162
The Third Circuit began its analysis by addressing whether the
ban on SOCE—a “‘talk therapy’ that is administered wholly
through verbal communication,”—constituted a restriction on
156

Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2013)
(plaintiffs arguing that California’s prohibition on performing SOCE on minors
violated their free speech rights); with King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767
F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs arguing that New Jersey’s prohibition on
performing SOCE on minors violated their free speech rights).
157
N.J. S TAT . A NN . §§ 45:1-55 (West 2013).
158
Id.
159
King, 767 F.3d at 220–21. The plaintiffs in the case were Tara King, Ed.
D., individually and on behalf of her patients; Ronald Newman, Ph.D.,
individually and on behalf of his patients; the National Association for Research
and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”); and the American Association of
Christian Counsellors. Id.
160
See King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 317–19 (D.N.J. 2013)
(finding support for the conclusion that A3371 regulates conduct from the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Pickup).
161
Id. at 303.
162
King, 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014).
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speech or a regulation of conduct.163 Phrased differently, the court
began by asking “whether verbal communications become
‘conduct’ when they are used as a vehicle for mental health
treatment.”164 The court looked first to Humanitarian Law Project
and disagreed with the Ninth Circuit as to its applicability. The
court held, citing the reasoning of Judge O’Scannlain, that
Humanitarian Law Project rejected “the argument that verbal
communications become ‘conduct’ when they are used to deliver
professional services” and that “the enterprise of labeling certain
verbal or written communications ‘speech’ and others ‘conduct’ is
unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”165 The court
considered the verbal SOCE communications to be “speech for the
purposes of the First Amendment” and rejected the “labeling
game” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit and the District
Court.166
The court next turned to the question of “the level of First
Amendment protection afforded to speech that occurs as part of the
practice of a licensed profession.”167 The court first recognized,
citing Lowe and Casey, that regulations that restrict “what a
professional can and cannot say” reveal the uncomfortable tension
between the police powers of the state and the First Amendment
rights of professionals.168 Although the court could not
characterize the verbal communications in SOCE as conduct, it
also could not undermine New Jersey’s interest in protecting the
general public from those whose “specialized knowledge” puts
them in a position of authority—one which actors could use to
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. at 228 (“[W]hat the Supreme Court did not do [in Humanitarian Law
Project] was reclassify this communication as ‘conduct’ based on the nature or
function of what was communicated.”).
166
Id. at 229.
167
Id. Significantly, the court recognized here that the approach taken by
the district court and the Ninth Circuit—the approach which characterized
verbal communications as conduct—problematically “obscured [this] important
constitutional inquiry.” Id. Because those courts held that the statutes merely
regulated conduct, they never needed to decide the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to the statutes.
168
Id. at 229–33.
164
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manipulate and harm others if gone unchecked.169 The court
concluded, therefore, “that a licensed professional does not enjoy
the full protection of the First Amendment when speaking as part
of the practice of her profession.”170
Having decided that the type of professional speech that occurs
in SOCE does not deserve full First Amendment protection, the
court addressed whether it should receive “some lesser degree of
protection or no protection at all.”171 Comparing professional
speech to commercial speech,172 the court concluded that
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.173
The court held that “a prohibition of professional speech is
permissible only if it ‘directly advances’ the State’s substantial
interest in protecting clients from ineffective or harmful
professional services and is ‘not more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.’”174
Once it had defined professional speech and articulated the
applicable standard of scrutiny, the court evaluated the New Jersey
169

Id. at 232 (“To handcuff the State’s ability to regulate a profession
whenever speech is involved would therefore unduly undermine its authority to
protect its citizens from harm.”).
170
Id. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the
interpretations of Lowe and Casey in Moore-King, Pickup, and Wollschlaeger.
Id. at 231–32. Although the court disagreed with many aspects of these other
circuit court opinions, it did agree with the courts’ analyses regarding the
diminished First Amendment protection for professional speech. Id. at 231. The
Third Circuit did not ultimately agree that the finding of a “personal nexus
between professional and client” meant that First Amendment protection
disappeared, but it did recognize that such a nexus meant that First Amendment
protection would be lessened. Id. at 232. (“We believe a professional’s speech
warrants lesser protection only when it is used to provide personalized services
to a client based on the professional’s expert knowledge and judgment.”).
171
Id. at 233–37.
172
Id. at 233–35 (“We believe that commercial and professional speech
share important qualities and, thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review for prohibitions aimed at either category.”).
173
Id. at 235.
174
Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The court recognized that the Fourth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits had all come to different conclusions about which
standard of review to apply, but argued that Supreme Court precedent dictated
that a more heightened scrutiny than rational basis should apply. Id. at 236.
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statute’s constitutionality.175 The court found a compelling interest
in protecting minors from harmful or ineffective practices and
found that the statute directly advanced this interest.176 The court
cited the legislative record—which contained widespread public
condemnation of SOCE by “reputable professional and scientific
organizations”—as evidence of SOCE’s ineffectiveness and
potential harmfulness.177 The court then concluded that the statute
was not “more extensive than necessary to protect [the State’s]
interest.”178 Having subjected the statute to intermediate scrutiny,
the court then held that A3371 was a constitutionally “permissible
prohibition179 of professional speech.”
The Third Circuit’s formulaic approach in King accomplished
what the Supreme Court had failed to do in previous cases. The
court presented an articulable definition of professional speech and
clearly identified intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard
of review. This approach can better guide lower courts dealing
with statutes regulating professional speech and avoid the pitfalls
of the “labeling game” approach.
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A. The Problems of the Speech/Conduct Dichotomy
The reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup and the
Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger permits courts to arbitrarily
label verbal communications as either speech or conduct.180 As
175

Id. at 237–40.
Id. at 237–38.
177
Id. at 238.
178
Id. at 239. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute
was overly burdensome and recognized that the state “is not required to employ
the least restrictive means conceivable” as long as it “demonstrate[s] narrow
tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest.” Id. (citing Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)
(citations omitted)). Because A3371 had a “scope . . . in proportion to the
interest served,” it demonstrated a sufficient degree of narrow tailoring to
survive intermediate scrutiny. Id.
179
Id. at 240.
180
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013); Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014).
176
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Judge O’Scannlain noted, the method provides “no principled
doctrinal basis” for establishing the dichotomy and no “criteria” by
which later courts could navigate it.181 According to Judge
O’Scannlain, the Supreme Court had previously “warned . . .
inferior courts against arrogating to themselves ‘any freewheeling
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of
the First Amendment.’”182 In his estimation, the Ninth Circuit in
Pickup—and the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger—did exactly
that, allowing future courts to find that “speech, uttered by
professionals to their clients, does not actually constitute ‘speech’
for the purposes of the First Amendment.”183 Although Judge
O’Scannlain primarily discussed the panel’s contravention of
governing Supreme Court precedent and its misreading of
applicable Ninth Circuit precedent,184 his dissent also demonstrates
a concern for the practical consequences of the panel’s decision.185
The “labeling game” approach—ultimately rejected by the Third
Circuit—creates categories of speech exempt from First
Amendment protection and impermissibly gives courts and
legislatures the power to restrict both socially useful and politically
unpopular speech by formulating the restriction as a “professional
regulation.”186
Similarly,
by
“labeling”
those
same
communications as speech deserving of full First Amendment
protection, courts may undermine the state’s ability to fully and
181

Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
182
Id. at 1221 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547
(2012)).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1218 (“[T]o justify its purported speech/conduct dichotomy in the
context of the professions, the panel instead invokes our decisions in [NAAP and
Conant], as well as scattered citations of non-authoritative cases. Supreme Court
precedent, however, as well as NAAP and Conant themselves, do not dictate
such conclusion—rather, they counsel against it.”).
185
Id. at 1215.
186
Id. Once again, Judge Wilson criticizes the majority and the Florida
legislature for this very reason. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d
1195, 1231 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“The poor fit between what
the Act actually does and the interests it purportedly serves belies Florida’s true
purpose in passing this Act: silencing doctors’ disfavored message about firearm
safety.”).

680

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

legitimately exercise its police powers.187
According to Judge O’Scannlain, the Ninth Circuit’s lack of a
“principled doctrinal basis” for its holding only exacerbates the
problems associated with the speech/conduct dichotomy.188 The
panel does illustrate a continuum along which courts can consider
“the First Amendment rights of professionals,” but, as both the
Third Circuit and Judge Wilson recognized, this continuum lacks a
clear method of application.189 The Third Circuit expressly
declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s three categories as it found
that the intermediate category and the conduct category usually
become conflated.190 Judge Wilson, after declining to comment on
whether Pickup was correctly decided,191 noted that he shared
Judge O’Scannlain’s “concern that the difference between the
intermediate category . . . and the unprotected category . . . may
prove to be illusory.”192 The Third Circuit’s holding in King
forecloses these concerns by clearly defining professional speech
and explicitly adopting the intermediate scrutiny standard of
review.
B. The Benefits of Intermediate Scrutiny
As Justice White noted in Lowe, cases that deal with
regulations of professional speech involve a collision of
interests.193 In the three cases discussed above the following three
interests emerge: (a) the state’s interest in regulating professions,
especially professions “which closely concern the public

187

King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2014).
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
189
See King, 767 F.3d at 232 n.15; Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1248 n.16
(Wilson, J., dissenting).
190
King, 767 F.3d at 232 n.15.
191
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1248 & n.16 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
192
Id. 1248 n.16.
193
Lowe v. S.E.C. 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (“This
issue involves a collision between the power of government to license and
regulate those who would pursue a profession or vocation and the rights of
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).
188
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health;”194 (b) the patients’ First Amendment interests in receiving
beneficial information;195 and (c) the physicians’ First Amendment
interests in their own speech rights.196 Preserving physicians’
speech rights also has the subsequent benefit of advancing the
values that the First Amendment is meant to protect—values such
as autonomy and democratic self-governance. The intermediate
scrutiny standard better protects these values by preventing courts
and legislatures from playing problematic “labeling games” with
regard to professional speech regulations. State legislatures retain
their ability to protect the public from harmful and ineffective
practices, but the courts can still protect the First Amendment
interests at stake in a doctor-patient relationship.
The states’ ability to regulate the professions under their police
powers is well established and is not challenged in any of the cases
discussed above.197 The “labeling game” approach, however,
significantly threatens this power by allowing courts to
characterize the verbal communications of professionals as
“speech” deserving of full First Amendment protection. This
characterization can result in the invalidation of statutes that
ultimately serve the state’s interests in protecting its citizens. In
Welch v. Brown, the Eastern District of California subjected SB
1172 to strict scrutiny and enjoined its enforcement.198 Although
194

King, 767 F.3d at 229 (citing Watson v. State of Maryland, 218 U.S.
173, 176 (1910)). The Supreme Court in Watson found this principle “too well
settled to require discussion.” Watson, 218 U.S. at 176.
195
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (recognizing that First Amendment protection extends
to both the source and the recipients of speech); see also King, 760 F.3d at 1258
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding violates patients’
First Amendment rights to receive potentially beneficial information from their
physicians).
196
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1258 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Doctors thus
have a significant interest in speaking freely, making inquiries, and recording
patients’ answers.”).
197
See King, 767 F.3d at 229 (citing Watson v. State of Maryland, 218 U.S.
173, 176 (1910)).
198
Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(enjoining the enforcement of SB 1172 as it lacked content and viewpoint
neutrality and likely could not withstand strict scrutiny) rev’d sub nom. Pickup
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
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the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, the District Court’s
reasoning demonstrates how a failure to fully define professional
speech and identify a standard of review can ultimately undermine
an important state interest—here, the protection of vulnerable
youth subjected to the dangers associated with SOCE.199 The
California legislature, in enacting SB 1172, relied upon “the welldocumented, prevailing opinion of the medical and psychological
community that SOCE had not been shown to be effective and that
it create[d] a potential risk of harm to those who experience[d]
it.”200 The Welch court acknowledged this evidence in its opinion,
but relied upon it only to support its holding that the statute lacked
content neutrality.201 The Third Circuit, on the other hand,
considered almost identical evidence in its determination that
A3371 directly advanced the state’s interest in protecting minors
from the harms of SOCE.202 Laws like SB 1172 and A3371 reflect
199

Interestingly, the District Court relied upon the same Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit authority in concluding that strict scrutiny should apply. The
court argued that “[t]he lower levels of review contemplated in Lowe and Casey
thus do not appear to apply if a law imposes restrictions on a professional’s
speech.” Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. The court also used the reasoning in
NAAP and Conant to conclude that strict scrutiny should apply, diverging from
the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in its determination that the statute lacked content
and viewpoint neutrality. Id.
200
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223 (9th Cir. 2013). The legislature
cited directly “position statements, articles, and reports” published by the
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
American School Counselor Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the American Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers,
the American Counseling Association, the American Psychoanalytic
Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and
the Pan American Health Organization, all of which affirmed the inefficacy of
SOCE and some of which warned about its potential dangers. S.B. 1172, 20112012 Sess. (Cal. 2012); see also supra, Part II.A.
201
Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“The
Legislature’s findings and declarations . . . bring SB 1172 within the contentbased exception” wherein “intermediate scrutiny does not apply.”), rev’d sub
nom. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
202
King, 767 F.3d at 238–39 (“We conclude that New Jersey has satisfied
[its burden to establish that A3371 directly advances the state’s interest]. The
legislative record demonstrates that over the last few decades a number of wellknown, reputable professional and scientific organizations have publicly
condemned the practice of SOCE, expressing serious concerns about its
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the legislatures’ reaction to the weight of medical evidence
condemning a harmful medical practice, and the intermediate
scrutiny standard allows for courts to uphold those laws, even if
speech rights are implicated, so long as they “directly advance” a
state interest and “are not more extensive than necessary.”203
Conversely, the intermediate scrutiny standard also allows for
courts to ensure that states do not abuse their police powers by
enacting statutes that purport to “prohibit the provision of harmful
or ineffective professional services” but instead serve “to inhibit
politically-disfavored messages.”204 In his Wollschlaeger dissent,
Judge Wilson recognized the importance of the state’s asserted
interests in defending FOPA.205 He argued, however, that the state
offered “no evidence to show that those rights [were] under threat”
or that FOPA “either directly or materially” advanced the interests
proposed. 206 This disconnect between the asserted interest and the
advancement of that interest led Judge Wilson to conclude that
“Florida’s true purpose in passing” FOPA was to “[silence]
doctors’ disfavored message about firearm safety.”207 Unlike Judge
O’Scannlain, who declined to assess the merits of SB 1172 under
any level of scrutiny,208 Judge Wilson applied the intermediate
potential to inflict harm.”).
203
See id. at 237 (“The New Jersey legislature has targeted SOCE
counseling for prohibition because it was presented with evidence that this
particular form of counseling is ineffective and potentially harmful to clients.”);
see also, Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering
Partisan Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293,
322–28 (2014) (providing a more in depth analysis of the medical evidence
supporting California’s SB 1172).
204
King, 767 F.3d at 236.
205
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195, 1230–31 (11th
Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“The State’s asserted interests in protecting
the rights of firearm owners, including their privacy rights, their rights to be free
from harassment and discrimination, and their ability to access medical care, are
incredibly important.”).
206
Id. at 1231.
207
Id.
208
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Although no Judge applies
intermediate scrutiny to SB 1172, the Third Circuit’s review of A3371 certainly
mirrors what that application would entail, especially considering the depth with
which the Third Circuit analyzed the Pickup opinion. See King, 767 F.3d at 224–
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scrutiny standard and found that each challenged provision failed
to survive the inquiry.209 Mirroring the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
adopting the intermediate scrutiny standard, Judge Wilson
concluded his First Amendment analysis by recognizing that
“[i]ntermediate scrutiny standards ensure not only that the State’s
interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed upon
speech but also that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored
message.”210
In a similar way, the intermediate scrutiny standard also
protects the First Amendment rights of patients. As the Supreme
Court noted in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, both the source
and the recipient of communication are afforded the protection of
the First Amendment.211 The “labeling game” approach
undermines this interest by potentially limiting the beneficial
information a patient can receive from her doctor, even when the
limitation does not advance any government interest. Judge Wilson
addressed this point directly in his dissent when he recognized that
FOPA burdens a patient’s right to receive information about the
dangers of firearms by prohibiting “even the opening question in
the firearm conversation.”212 The intermediate standard more
adequately protects the patient’s First Amendment right to receive
information that may ultimately prove beneficial. In the medical
context this is especially significant as the information being
restricted is often information that is unavailable elsewhere and
can potentially be life-saving.213 The standard ultimately ensures
that if courts or legislatures limit that right, the limitation “directly
advances” a government interest and “is not more extensive than
necessary.”214
For this same reason, intermediate scrutiny also serves to better
protect the First Amendment rights of medical professionals as it
29.
209
210

Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1257–67 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1267 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2688

(2011)).
211

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
212
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1257 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
213
Id.
214
King, 767 F.3d at 239 (citation omitted).
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permits courts to assess the proportionality of the state’s interests
and the subsequent First Amendment burdens. According to the
Supreme Court, the practice of medicine is “subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the state,”215 but, as the Ninth Circuit
noted in Conant, “being a member of a regulated profession does
not . . . result in a surrender of First Amendment rights.”216 Both
the panel in Pickup and the majority in Wollschlaeger use the
“personal nexus” analysis from Lowe to categorically remove
physicians’ verbal communications from the realm of First
Amendment protection.217 An intermediate scrutiny standard
prevents this from happening arbitrarily,218 and in the process
preserves important First Amendment values that are enhanced by
physicians’ speech, even when that speech occurs pursuant to the
physician-patient relationship.
First, providing physicians with First Amendment protection—
even diminished First Amendment protection—effectively
promotes the liberty theory of the First Amendment.219 According
to the liberty theory, “the free speech clause protects . . . an arena
of individual liberty from certain types of governmental
restrictions. Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good
but because of the value of speech conduct to the individual.”220
215

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002).
217
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (“At the other
end of the continuum, and where we conclude that SB 1172 lands, is the
regulation of professional conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though
such regulation may have an incidental effect on speech.”); Wollschlaeger, 760
F.3d at 1217 (“We find that the Act is a valid regulation of professional conduct
that has only an incidental effect on physicians’ speech. As such the Act does
not facially violate the First Amendment.”).
218
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (arguing that the panel’s “labeling game” approach was only
exacerbated by the lack of a “principled doctrinal basis” for adopting and
applying it).
219
See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2373–74 (arguing that the liberty theory
should restrict the state’s ability to compel physicians’ speech in the context of
informed consent abortion statutes, especially when the speech compelled does
no more than espouse the state’s ideological beliefs).
220
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978).
216
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Under this theory “free speech . . . has constitutional value because
of its important role in protecting an individual’s autonomy and
right of self-definition.”221 Although the Third Circuit did not
address this idea in its adoption of intermediate scrutiny, the
standard more effectively protects it. For example, as Judge
Wilson noted in his dissent, FOPA prevented physicians from
engaging in speech consistent both with their own beliefs and with
established medical authority, all pursuant to a legislative interest
in inhibiting a disfavored political message.222 Because the
majority adopted the “labeling game” approach and characterized
the physicians’ verbal communications as conduct, the plaintiffs
were prevented from speaking—a direct contravention of their
autonomy interests—even though the statute did not directly
advance an important state interest.223 Medical professionals may
only receive diminished First Amendment protection, but, by
preventing courts and legislatures from eliminating that protection
entirely, the intermediate scrutiny standard promotes the
physicians’ liberty and autonomy interests.
Providing physicians with First Amendment protection also
promotes the democratic self-governance theory of the First
Amendment.224 This theory “is premised on the belief that free
expression is necessary for the proper functioning of government
and democracy.”225 It is pursuant to this theory that the Supreme
Court held that commercial speech receives First Amendment

221

Keighley, supra note 25, at 2373.
Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1233 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
223
Id.
224
See Keighley, supra note 25, at 2371 (2013) (“A more persuasive
rationale for extending the First Amendment to physician speech can be found in
the democratic self-government theory.”); Post, supra note 25, at 974 (arguing
that the First Amendment that has been extended to commercial speech should
be extended to the speech of physicians, as the same interests are served by
both).
225
Clay Calvert et al., Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal
and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
525, 565 (2014); see also Keighley, supra note 25, at 2371–72 (“Under this
theory, the First Amendment’s scope should be interpreted in light of the
amendment’s ultimate goal: a well-informed citizenry that can make wise voting
decisions, thus ensuring the success of democratic self-government.”).
222
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protection, albeit diminished protection.226 As Dean Post notes,
“[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so
much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because it
furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial
information.’”227 Despite the fact that the physician-patient
engagement generally takes place in a private sphere, Dean Post
argues “[t]hat there is significant precedent . . . for the extension of
First Amendment value to speech that is not in itself public
discourse, but that is nevertheless constitutionally understood as
communicating information necessary to ‘enlighten public
decisionmaking in a democracy.’”228 Physician speech is
significant in this context, even within a physician-patient
relationship, as it can contribute to how members of the public
“think about the provision of medical care generally.”229 As
opposed to the “labeling game” approach, the Third Circuit’s
intermediate scrutiny standard, premised on the protections the
Supreme Court provided for commercial speech, allows for the
“content of physician-patient communications” to contribute to the
“formation of public opinion” and the promotion of the First
Amendment’s democratic self-governance function.230
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s approach in King can bring much needed
consistency and stability to an important area of constitutional
jurisprudence now characterized by confusion and ambiguity. By
foreclosing the dichotomy between speech and conduct, the
226

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); see also Post, supra note 25, at 974 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides.”).
227
Post, supra note 25, at 974 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
228
Id. at 976 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
229
Id. at 978.
230
Id. at 974.
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intermediate scrutiny approach can better protect the states’
interest in prohibiting potentially harmful or ineffective
professional practices, and at the same time decrease the potential
for state legislatures to inhibit disfavored political messages. The
approach can also better protect the patient’s and physician’s First
Amendment rights and the values that those rights advance. This
dichotomy has allowed courts to insulate categories of speech from
First Amendment protection by characterizing as “conduct” verbal
communications from professionals to clients and patients. The
approach can also, as evidenced in Judge Wilson’s dissent, force
state lawmakers to more carefully draft legislation that may
implicate the First Amendment rights of professionals. Although
King does not bind any of the other circuits, the implicit benefits of
the Third Circuit’s approach may persuade other circuits to follow
suit.
The Supreme Court will ultimately decide how to define
professional speech and will decide the standard by which
regulations restricting such speech will be scrutinized. The Third
Circuit’s formulaic analysis, however, especially when considered
alongside that of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, may convince
the Court to adopt the intermediate scrutiny standard moving
forward. As cases like Wollschlaeger and Pickup demonstrate, the
application of rational basis review to statutes that regulate the
communications of professionals runs the serious risk of underprotecting both socially valuable and politically disfavored speech.
As Welch v. Brown clearly shows, the application of strict scrutiny,
and the subsequent over-protection of those communications, can
leave states unable to protect their citizens from harmful
professional practices. The problem with the labeling game
approach is not only that it allows these outcomes, but that it
allows them to happen arbitrarily, as the contours of professional
speech are difficult to identify. The Third Circuit’s approach
provides clarity and, more significantly, principle, to this difficult
area of the law and the Supreme Court would be wise to adopt it as
their own approach to professional speech moving forward.

